In this paper we discuss the parallel implementation of the auction algorithm for the classical assignment problem. We show that the algorithm admits a totally asynchronous implementation and we consider several implementations on a shared memory machine, with varying degrees of synchronization. We also discuss and explore computationally the tradeoffs involved in using asynchronism to reduce the synchronization penalty.
INTRODUCTION
We consider the classical problem of optimal assignment of n persons to n objects. Given a benefit aij that person i associates with object j, we want to find an assignment of persons to objects, on a one-to-one basis, that maximizes the total benefit. The auction algorithm, a method for solving this problem first proposed in [Ber79] , and subsequently developed and extended in [Ber85] , [Ber86] , [Ber88] , [BeE88] , [BeC89a] , and [BeC89b] , has been shown to be very effective in practice, perticularly for sparse problems. The algorithm operates like an auction. There is a price for each object, and at each iteration, unassigned persons bid simultaneously for their "best" objects thereby raising the corresponding prices. Objects are then awarded to the highest bidder.
For a tutorial presentation of the algorithm, we refer to [Ber89] .
The method is also well suited for implementation on parallel machines. There are two basic approaches here, as well as a third one that combines the first two. In the first approach, the bids of several unassigned persons are carried out in parallel, with a single processor assigned to each bid; we call this approach Jacobi parallelization in view of its similarity with parallel Jacobi methods for solving systems of equations. In the second approach, there is only one bid carried out at a time, but the calculation of the bids is done in parallel by several processors; we call this approach Gauss-Seidel parallelization. Finally, the third approach is a hybrid whereby multiple bids are carried out in parallel, and the calculation of each bid is shared by several processors. This third approach, with proper choice of the number of processors used for each parallel task, has the maximum speedup potential.
The auction algorithm is also a natural candidate for a totally asynchronous implementation, whereby the bid calculations may be done with out-of-date object price information and the highest bidder awards and subsequent price adjustments may be done with out-of-date bid information.
The potential advantage of an asynchronous implementation is a reduction of the synchronization penalty. This is the delay incurred when several processors synchronize to calculate in parallel a single person bid, when several processors calculating separate person bids in parallel wait to make sure that up-to-date price information is available, and when the processors calculating in parallel the highest bidder awards wait for all bids to come in. Asynchronous algorithms are discussed in detail in [BeT89] , which gives many other references.
In this paper, we explore the merits of various synchronous and asynchronous implementations of the auction algorithm in a shared memory multiple instruction stream, multiple data stream (MIMD) parallel computer (the Encore Multimax). We prove the validity of an asynchronous 1. Introduction implementation. Such a proof may also be inferred from the analysis of an asynchronous implementation of the -relaxation method [Ber86] , [BeE88] , which contains the auction algorithm as a special case but can also solve general linear network problems. This inference is, however, very complex. The proof of this paper is based on first principles and is far simpler because it focuses on the assignment problem and is based on a less complex model of asynchronous computation.
In this paper we also compare a variety of synchronous and asynchronous implementations of the auction algorithm, in an effort to quantify the tradeoffs between Jacobi and Gauss-Seidel parallelization, as well as the effects of asynchronism. Our conclusion is that fairly substantial speedups (up to about 7 using a maximum of 16 processors) of the auction algorithm can be obtained on the Multimax, and that successful asynchronous implementations substantially outperform their synchronous counterparts. There have been several computational studies with parallel implementations of the auction algorithm as well as other assignment algorithms, but to our knowledge, the present paper is the first to report on the practical performance of asynchronous versions in a real parallel machine.
In particular, Kempa, Kennington, and Zaki [KKZ89] have reported on the parallel performance of various synchronous implementations of the auction algorithm on the Alliant FX/8 computer.
They have experimented exclusively with dense problems and without using scaling. They implemented a synchronous hybrid algorithm which uses the vector processing capability of each of the Alliant's processors to scan the admissible objects for each bid, and uses multiple processors to process several bids in parallel. The Alliant FX/8 performs a lot of its synchronization in hardware, and therefore does not require the careful software synchronization which was used in our implementations on the Encore Multimax. For problems comparable to those of the size reported in this paper (e.g. 1000 person dense assignment problems, cost range [1,1000]), Kempa et. al. obtained total speedups of 8.578 for their hybrid auction algorithm using 8 vector processors. Such a speedup reflects the increased potential for Gauss-Seidel parallelism in dense problems and also the vector capability of each processor in the Alliant FX/8. Kempa et. al. did not attempt to explain their overall speedup in terms of the speedup contributed by the vector processors and the speedup contributed by the multiple concurrent bids. Thus, it is not clear from their reported results whether an effective combination of Gauss-Seidel and Jacobi parallelization was occurring.
Castanon, Smith, and Wilson [CSW89] have studied the effectiveness of different synchronous implementations of the Gauss-Seidel auction algorithm, and the algorithm of Jonker and Volgenant [JoV87] for solving dense and sparse assignment problems on different multiprocessor architectures.
The latter algorithm is a two-phase method; the first phase is based on the relaxation method of [Ber81] and [Ber82] , and is in fact the same as the auction algorithm with = 0; the second 2. The Auction Algorithm phase is a sequential shortest path method. The work of [CSW89] illustrates the superiority of single instruction stream, multiple data stream (SIMD) architectures for achieving Gauss-Seidel parallelism, with demonstrated reductions in computation time (relative to the computation time on a single-processor Encore Multimax) in the order of 60 for assignment problems with 1000
persons. This work did not attempt to combine Gauss-Seidel and Jacobi parallelism for maximal speedup. Additional work on SIMD architectures was reported by Phillips and Zenios [PhZ88] , and by Wein and Zenios [WeZ90] with synchronous implementations of the Jacobi auction algorithm using -scaling on the Connection Machine CM-2 for dense problems.
Kennington and Wang [KeW88] have reported on a parallel implementation of the Jonker and Volgenant algorithm [JoV87] for dense assignment problems on the 8-processor Sequent Symmetry S81. In their implementation, multiple processors are used to construct shortest paths from a single unassigned person. This may be viewed as Gauss-Seidel parallelization for successive shortest path methods. For a dense 1000 person assignment problems with cost range [1-1000], they report a speedup of 3.6 using 8 processors versus using a single processor.
Balas, Miller, Pekny, and Toth [BMP89] have developed a synchronous parallel successive shortest path algorithm, which allows for the determination of multiple augmenting paths simultaneously, and have successfully implemented it on a 14-processor Butterfly Plus computer. Their algorithm may be viewed as Jacobi parallelization for successive shortest path methods, since it handles multiple unassigned persons in parallel. For a comparable 1000 person dense assignment problem with cost range [1,1000], they obtained a speedup of 2.21 for the successive shortest path part of their algorithm, and an overall speedup of 2.17 when compared to the sequential version of the algorithm implemented on the same computer. Larger speedups were obtained with much larger dense problems.
In the next section we provide an overview of the auction algorithm and in Section 3 we define and prove the validity of the totally asynchronous version. In Section 4 we discuss general issues of parallel synchronous and asynchronous implementation, with an emphasis on shared memory machines and the Encore Multimax in particular. In Section 5 we discuss a variety of implementations and we report on the results of our computational tests.
THE AUCTION ALGORITHM
In the assignment problem that we consider, n persons wish to allocate among themselves n objects, on a one-to-one basis. Each person i must select his/her object from a given subset A(i).
The Auction Algorithm
There is a given benefit a ij that i associates with each j ∈ A(i). An assignment is a set of k personobject pairs (i1, j1), . . . , (i k , j k ), such that 0 ≤ k ≤ n, jm ∈ A(im) for all m, and the persons i1, . . . , i k and objects j 1 , . . . , j k are all distinct. The total benefit of the assignment is the sum k m=1 a imjm of the benefits of the assigned pairs. An assignment is called complete (or incomplete) if it contains k = n (or k < n, respectively) person-object pairs. We want to find a complete assignment with maximum total benefit, assuming that there exists at least one complete assignment. This is the classical assignment problem, studied algorithmically by many authors [Bal85] , [Bal86] , [BGK77] , [Ber81] , [CMT88] , [Der85] , [Eng82] , [GGK82] , [Gol85] , [Hal56] , [Hun83] , [JoV87] , [McG83] , [Mun56] , [Tho81] , beginning with Kuhn's Hungarian method [Kun55].
In the auction algorithm, each object j has a price p j with the initial prices being arbitrary.
Prices are adjusted upwards as persons "bid" for their "best" object, that is, the object for which the corresponding benefit minus the price is maximal. Only persons without an object submit a bid, and objects are awarded to their highest bidder.
In particular, the prices p j are adjusted at the end of "bidding" iterations. At the beginning of each iteration, we have a set of object prices and an incomplete assignment, and the algorithm terminates when a complete assignment is obtained. Each iteration involves a subset I of the persons that are unassigned at the beginning of the iteration. It has two phases:
Each person i ∈ I determines an object j i ∈ A(i) for which a ij − p j is maximized over j, i.e.
and submits a bid pj i + γi for this object, where γ i is a positive bidding increment to be specified shortly.
Assignment Phase:
Each object j that receives one or more bids, determines the highest of these bids, increases pj to the highest bid, and gets assigned to the person who submitted the highest bid. The person that was assigned to j at the beginning of the iteration (if any) is now left without an object (and becomes eligible to bid at the next iteration). If an object does not receive any bid during an iteration, its price and assignment status is left unchanged.
It can be shown that if the bidding increments γ i are bounded from below by some > 0, this auction process terminates in a finite number of iterations with all persons having an object. To get a sense of this, note that if an object receives a bid in m iterations, its price must exceed its 5 2. The Auction Algorithm initial price by at least m , while if an object is unassigned, its price has not yet changed from its initial value. Thus, for sufficiently large m, the object will become "expensive" enough to be judged "inferior" to some unassigned object by each person. It follows that there is a bounded number of iterations at which an object can be considered best and thus be preferred to all unassigned objects by some person. (This argument as stated, assumes that it is feasible to assign any person to any object but it can be generalized for the case where the set of feasible person-object pairs is limited, as long as there exists at least one feasible complete assignment; see e.g. [Ber88] , [BeT89] .)
Whether the complete assignment obtained upon termination of the auction process is optimal depends strongly on the method for choosing the bidding increments γi. In a real auction, a prudent bidder would not place an excessively high bid for fear the object might be won at an unnecessarily high price. Consistent with this intuition, one can show that if the bidding increment γ i is small enough to ensure that even after the bid is accepted, the object will be "almost best" for the bidder, then the final assignment will be "almost optimal". In particular, we can show that if upon termination, we have
(a property known as -complementary slackness or -CS for short), then the total benefit of the final assignment is within n of being optimal.
For a first principles derivation of this, note that the total benefit of any complete assignment
for any set of prices {p j | j = 1, . . . , n}, since the second term of the right-hand side is no less than
while the first term is equal to n i=1 p j i . Therefore, the optimal total assignment benefit cannot exceed the quantity
On the other hand, if the -CS property (1) holds upon termination of the auction process, then by adding Eq. (1) over all i, we see that
2. The Auction Algorithm
Since the left side above cannot be less than A * , which as argued earlier, cannot be less than the optimal total assignment benefit, we see that the final total assignment benefit n i=1 aij i is within n of being optimal.
We note parenthetically, that the preceding derivation is guided by duality theory; the assignment problem can be formulated as a linear programming problem, and the minimization problem in the right side of Eq. (2) is a dual problem (see e.g. [BeT89] , [Dan63] , [PaS82] , [Roc84] ).
Suppose now that the benefits a ij are all integer, which is the typical practical case (if a ij are rational, they can be scaled up to integer by multiplication with a suitable common positive integer).
Then, the total benefit of any assignment is integer, so if n < 1, a complete assignment that is within n of being optimal must be optimal. It follows, that if
the benefits a ij are all integer, and the -CS condition (1) is satisfied upon termination, then the assignment obtained is optimal .
There is a standard method for choosing the bidding increments γi so as to maintain the -CS condition (1) throughout the auction process, assuming this condition is satisfied by the initial prices and the initial assignment (as is trivially the case when no objects are assigned initially). In this method, is a fixed positive number, and the bidding increment γ i is given by
where vi is the best object value, vi = max
attained for an object j i , and w i is the "second best" object value
We will assume for convenience throughout that A(i) contains at least two objects, so the maximum in Eq. (6) is well defined. This choice of the bidding increment is shown in Fig. 1 . Note that we have γi ≥ , so based on the earlier argument, this choice guarantees termination of the auction algorithm. The -CS property is also maintained if γ i has any value between and + v i − w i .
However, termination of the auction process is typically faster with the maximal choice of Eq. (4).
Note that any nonempty subset I of unassigned persons may submit a bid at each iteration.
This gives rise to a variety of possible implementations, named after their analogs in relaxation and Generally, in a serial computation environment, experiments have shown that the Gauss-Seidel implementation tends to be the fastest, but with a parallel machine, the choice is unclear because all the bids of the persons in I may be calculated in parallel. It is important to consider all these different versions because they provide starting points for different synchronous and asynchronous parallel implementations, to be discussed in Section 4.
3. The Totally Asynchronous Version of the Auction Algorithm
Computational Aspects --Scaling
The auction algorithm exhibits interesting computational behavior and it is essential to understand this behavior in order to implement the algorithm efficiently.
We first note that the amount of work to solve the problem can depend strongly on the value of and on the maximum absolute object value
Basically, for many types of problems, the number of bidding iterations up to termination tends to be proportional to C/ . We note also that there is a dependence on the initial prices; if these prices are "near optimal", it can be expected that the number of iterations to solve the problem will be relatively small. This suggests the idea of -scaling, which consists of applying the algorithm several times, starting with a large value of and successively reducing up to an ultimate value which is less than the critical value 1/n. Each application of the algorithm provides good initial prices for the next application. In practice, it is a good idea to at least consider scaling. For sparse assignment problems, that is, problems where the set of feasible assignment pairs is severely restricted, scaling seems almost universally helpful. This was established experimentally at the time of the original proposal of the auction algorithm [Ber79] . There is also a related polynomial complexity analysis [BeE88] , [BeT89] that uses some of the earlier ideas of an -scaling analysis [Gol87] , [GoT87] for the -relaxation method of [Ber86] . For more on this issue, we refer to [BeE88] and [BeC89b] , which contain extensive computational results.
Our implementation of -scaling is as follows: the integer benefits a ij are first multiplied by n + 1 and the auction algorithm is applied with progressively lower value of , up to the point where becomes 1 or smaller (because a ij have been scaled by n + 1, it is sufficient for optimality of the final assignment to have ≤ 1). The sequence of values used is
where ∆ and θ are parameters set by the user with ∆ > 0 and θ > 1. (In our implementations, we used ∆ = C/4 and 4 ≤ θ ≤ 8.)
THE TOTALLY ASYNCHRONOUS VERSION OF THE AUCTION ALGORITHM
One may view a synchronous parallel algorithm as a sequence of consecutive computation segments called phases. The computations within each phase are divided in some way among the processors of a parallel computing system. The computations of any two processors within each phase are independent, so the algorithm is mathematically equivalent to some serial algorithm.
Phases are separated by synchronization points, which are times at which all processors have completed the computations of a given phase but no processor has yet started the computations of the next phase. In asynchronous parallel algorithms, the coordination of the computations of the processors is less strict. Processors are allowed to proceed with computations of a phase with data which may be out-of-date because the computations of the previous phase are incomplete. An asynchronous algorithm may contain some synchronization points but these are generally fewer than the ones of the corresponding synchronous version.
To get a first idea of the totally asynchronous implementation of the auction algorithm, it is useful to think of a person as an autonomous decision maker that obtains at unpredictable times information about the prices of the objects. Each unassigned person makes a bid at arbitrary times on the basis of its current object price information (that may be outdated because of communication delays). In a shared memory machine context, the role of the unassigned person is played by one or more processors that retrieve object prices from shared memory, and calculate a bid for the best object. There is asynchronism because the prices may have changed while the processors are calculating the bid.
We now formulate the totally asynchronous model, and we prove its validity. We denote p j (t) = Price of object j at time t rj(t) = Person assigned to object j at time t [rj(t) = 0 if object j is unassigned] U (t) = Set of unassigned persons at time t [i ∈ U(t) if r j (t) = i for all objects j].
We assume that U(t), p j (t), and r j (t) can change only at integer times t; this involves no loss of generality, since t may be viewed as the index of a sequence of physical times at which events of interest occur.
In addition to U (t), p j (t), and r j (t), the algorithm maintains at each time t, a subset R(t) ⊂ U (t) of unassigned persons that may be viewed as having a "ready bid" at time t. We assume that by time t, a person i ∈ R(t) has used prices p j τ ij (t) and p j τ ij (t) from some earlier (but otherwise arbitrary) times τ ij (t) and τ ij (t) with τ ij (t) ≤ τ ij (t) ≤ t to compute the best value
a best object j i (t) attaining the above maximum,
the second best value
and has determined a bid
(Note that ordinarily the best and second best values should be computed simultaneously, which implies that τ ij (t) = τ ij (t). In some cases, however, it may be more natural or advantageous to compute the second best value after the best value, with more up-to-date price information, which corresponds to the case τij(t) ≤ τ ij (t) for some pairs (i, j).)
The implication here is that unassigned persons i will enter the set R(t) and become eligible to bid, following some computations which update j i (t) and β i (t). However, to maximize the generality and flexibility of our model, the precise mechanism by which these computations are done is left unspecified subject to the following two assumptions:
Assumption 1:
Assumption 2: For all i, j, and t,
Clearly an asynchronous auction algorithm cannot solve the problem if unassigned persons stop submitting bids and if old information is not eventually discarded. This is the motivation for the preceding two assumptions.
Initially, each person is assigned to at most one object, that is, r j (0) = r j (0) for all assigned objects j and j , and it will be seen that the algorithm preserves this propertry throughout its course. Furthermore, initially -CS holds, that is,
It will be shown shortly that this property is also preserved during the algorithm.
At each time t, if R(t) is empty nothing happens. If R(t) is nonempty the following occur:
(a) A nonempty subset I(t) ⊂ R(t) of persons that have a bid ready is selected.
(b) Each object j for which the corresponding bidder set
is nonempty, determines the highest bid
and a person i j (t) for which the above maximum is attained
Then, the pair p j (t), r j (t) is changed according to
The above description of the algorithm requires an infinite number of iterations; however, this is merely a mathematical convenience. In practice, the algorithm can be stopped as soon as the set of unassigned persons U(t) is empty; this can be detected by counting the number of times that unassigned objects are assigned for the first time. We say that the algorithm terminates at time t if t is the first time k such that U (k) is empty.
Notice that if τ ij (t) = t and U(t) = R(t) for all t, then the asynchronous algorithm is equivalent to the synchronous version given in Section 2. The asynchronous model becomes relevant in a parallel computation context where some processors compute bids for some unassigned persons, while other processors simultaneously update some of the object prices and corresponding assigned persons.
Suppose that a single processor calculates a bid of person i by using the values a ij − p j τ ij (t) prevailing at times τ ij (t) and then calculates the maximum value at time t; see Fig. 2 . Then, if the price of an object j ∈ A(i) is updated between times τij(t) and t by some other processor, the maximum value will be based on out-of-date information. The asynchronous algorithm models this possibility by allowing τ ij (t) < t. A similar situation arises when the bid of person i is calculated cooperatively by several processors rather than by a single processor.
The following proposition, establishes the validity of the asynchronous auction algorithm of this section.
Proposition 1: Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and assume that there exists at least one complete assignment. Then for all t and all j for which rj(t) = 0, the pair pj(t), rj(t) satisfies the -CS condition max
Furthermore, there is a finite time at which the algorithm terminates. The complete assignment obtained upon termination is within n of being optimal, and is optimal if < 1/n and the benefits a ij are integer.
Proof: Let p j (t), r j (t) be a pair with r j (t) = 0. To simplify notation, let i = r j (t). We first consider times t at which p j was just updated, i.e., p j (t) > p j (t − 1) and i = r j (t − 1), and person i submitted a highest bid for object j at time t − 1. Then we have by construction 
and the maximum and second maximum values (here τ ij (t) = τ ij (t)). The values of p j may be out-of-date because they may have been updated by another processor between the read time τij(t) and the bid calculation time t.
where the last inequality follows using the fact p k (t) ≥ p k (t ) for all k and t, t with t ≥ t . Therefore, the -CS condition (16) holds for all t at which p j was just updated.
Next we consider times t for which p j was not just updated. Let t be the largest time which is less than t and for which pj(t ) > pj(t − 1); this is the largest time prior to t that object j was assigned to person i. By the preceding argument, we have
and since p j (t ) = p j (t), and p k (t) ≥ p k (t ) for all k, the -CS condition (16) again follows.
We next show that the algorithm terminates in finite time. We first note the following:
(a) Once an object is assigned, it remains assigned for the remainder of the algorithm (possibly to different persons). Furthermore, an unassigned object has a price equal to its initial price.
(b) Using Eqs. (8) and (10), and the relation p j τ ij (t) ≤ p j τ ij (t) , which holds because τij(t) ≤ τ ij (t), we have a ij i (t) − p j i (t) ≥ wi(t), so from Eq. (11) we see that
It follows from Eq. (13) that if person i bids for object j at time t, we must have
(c) Each time an object j receives a bid b j (t) at time t, there are two possibilities: either bj(t) < pj(t) + , in which case pj(t + 1) = pj(t), or else bj(t) ≥ pj(t) + , in which case p j (t + 1) ≥ p j (t) + and p j (t) increases by at least [cf. Eq. (15)]. In the latter case we call the bid substantive. Suppose that an object receives an infinite number of bids during the algorithm. Then, an infinite subset of these bids must be substantive; otherwise pj(t)
would stay constant for t sufficiently large, we would have p j τ ij (t) = p j (t) for t sufficiently large because old price information is eventually purged from the system (cf. Assumption 2), and in view of Eqs. (15) and (17), we would have p j (t + 1) ≥ p j (t) + for all times t at which j receives a bid, arriving at a contradiction.
Assume now, in order to obtain a contradiction, that the algorithm does not terminate finitely.
Then, because of Assumption 1, there is an infinite number of times t at which R(t) is nonempty and at each of these times, at least one object receives a bid. Thus, there is a nonempty subset of objects J ∞ which receive an infinite number of bids, and a nonempty subset of persons I ∞ which submit an infinite number of bids. In view of (c) above, the prices of all objects in J ∞ increase to ∞, and in view of (a) above all objects in J ∞ are assigned to some person for t sufficiently large.
Furthermore, the prices of all objects j / ∈ J ∞ stay constant for t sufficiently large and since old information is purged from the system (cf. Assumption 2), we also have p j τ ij (t) = p j (t) for all i, j / ∈ J ∞ , and t sufficiently large. These facts imply that for sufficiently large t, every object j ∈ A(i) which is not in J ∞ would be preferable for person i to every object j ∈ A(i) ∩ J ∞ . Since the -CS condition (1) holds throughout the algorithm, we see that for each person i ∈ I ∞ we must have
otherwise such a person would bid for an object not in J ∞ for sufficiently large t.
We now note that after sufficiently long time, the only bids taking place will be by persons in I ∞ bidding for objects in J ∞ , so each object in J ∞ will be assigned to some person from I ∞ , while at least one person in I ∞ will be unassigned (otherwise the algorithm would terminate). We conclude that the number of persons in I ∞ is larger than the number of objects in J ∞ . This, together with the earlier shown fact
implies that there is no complete assignment, contradicting our problem feasibility assumption.
The optimality properties of the assignment obtained upon termination follow from the -CS property shown and our earlier discussion on the synchronous version of the algorithm. Q.E.D.
SYNCHRONOUS AND ASYNCHRONOUS IMPLEMENTATIONS
In synchronous shared memory implementations of the auction algorithm, all bidding and assign- best value, and second best value are calculated within each group in parallel by a separate processor. We call the calculations within a group a search task. After all the search tasks are completed (a synchronization of the processors is required to check this) the results are "merged" by one of the processors who finds the best value over all best group values, while simultaneously computing the corresponding best object and size of bid. (It is possible to do the merging in parallel using several processors, but this is inefficient when the number of processors is small, as it was in our case, because of the extra synchronization and other overhead involved.) The drawback of this method over the preceding one is that it typically requires a larger number of iterations, since each iteration involves a single person. This is significant because even though each Gauss-Seidel iteration may take less time because it is executed by multiple processors in parallel, the synchronization overhead is roughly proportional to the number of iterations.
(c) Hybrid approach (or block Gauss-Seidel parallelization): In this approach, the bid calculations of each person are parallelized as in the preceding method, but the number of searcher processors used per bid is s, where 1 < s < p. We will assume that s divides evenly p, so we can compute the bids of p/s persons in parallel, assuming enough unassigned persons are available for the iteration (|I| ≥ p/s). With proper choice of s, this method combines the best features and alleviates the drawbacks of the preceding two.
Once the bidding phase of an iteration is completed (a synchronization point), the assignment phase is executed. This phase is carried out by a single processor in our synchronous implementations. While it is possible to consider using multiple processors to execute the assignment phase in parallel, the potential gain from parallelization is modest while the associated overhead more than offsets this gain in our system.
We have constructed an empirical model for the computation time per iteration of the block
Gauss-Seidel method with p processors and s search tasks per bid. This time is given by Let us assume for convenience that each set of admissible objects A(i) has the same number of elements, say n. By counting the number of operations and by assuming perfect load balancing between the search tasks (i.e., an equal number of objects n/s in each of the groups A 1 (i), . . . , A s (i)),
we have estimated roughly that the search time per iteration is S(p, s) = Constant · n s + log n s + log log n s .
(The logarithmic terms account for the calculations involving the second best value.) The merging time is proportional to s,
while the synchronization time was found experimentally to be roughly proportional to p S(p, s) = Constant · p ; see the next section.
Synchronous and Asynchronous Implementations
It can be seen that, given n, there are optimal values of p and s that minimize the total time per iteration. For example, if p and s are large, the increase of the synchronization and merging times may offset the potential gains from parallelization of the search tasks.
Another important consideration is that as p/s increases, the number of bids that can be calculated in parallel also increases, although not proportionally because near termination, the number of unassigned persons may be less than p/s. As a result, the number of iterations tends to decrease by a somewhat unpredictable factor, which is typically less than p/s. Because of this and because of various constants involved in the preceding estimates of the search, merging, and synchronization times, it is difficult to estimate a priori the optimal values of p and s to solve the problem. An interesting possibility that we did not try is to change dynamically s so that the number of unassigned persons is greater or equal to p/s throughout the algorithm.
An Asynchronous Implementation
In our asynchronous implementation, the bidding and merging calculations are divided in tasks, which are organized in a first in -first out queue. When a processor becomes free it starts executing the top task of the queue, if the queue is nonempty, and otherwise it checks whether a termination condition is satisfied. The algorithm stops when all processors encounter the termination condition.
Similarly as in synchronous block Gauss-Seidel implementation, each set of admissible objects
A(i) is divided in s groups of objects A 1 (i), . . . , A s (i). The calculation of the bid of a person i is divided in s tasks. The first s − 1 tasks are search tasks involving the groups of objects A 1 (i), . . . , A s−1 (i). To perform one of these tasks, a processor must calculate and store in memory the best value, second best value, and best object within the corresponding object group. The sth task starts with a search and memory storage of the best value, second best value, and best object within the group As(i), and following this, it completes the bid of person i by merging the individual group search results, that is, by finding the best object and bid for person i based on the currently stored group results. The sth task also includes raising the price of the best object and changing the assignment of the object (assuming the calculated bid is larger than the best object's price by at least ). An alternative is to create an extra task that changes the price and assignment of the objects; this leads, however, to an inefficient implementation as will be seen in the next section.
There are two sources of asynchronism here. First, it is possible for some prices to be changed between the time a search task is completed and the time the results of that task are used to calculate a person bid. Second, it is possible that the merging task of a person's bid is carried out before some of the search tasks associated with that bid are completed. In both cases the bid may reflect out-of-date price information and may prove ineffective in that it yields a bid that does not exceed the corresponding best object's price by at least .
Coded Implementations and Computational Results
The advantage of the asynchronous implementation is that processors do not remain idle waiting to get synchronized with other processors or waiting for merging tasks to be completed.
The extreme special case of the preceding algorithm, where s = 1 and a person's bid is calculated by a single processor, is called asynchronous Jacobi algorithm. Generally one obtains more efficient implementations when s > 1, but the optimal value of s depends on the dimension and the sparsity structure of the problem.
CODED IMPLEMENTATIONS AND COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS
In this section we describe the design and performance of six parallel auction algorithm implementations on the Encore Multimax. These implementations are: A comparison of the synchronous and asynchronous auction versions is also given in this section, based on solution of a broader range of problems.
Synchronous Gauss-Seidel Auction Algorithm
This algorithm processes a single bid at a time, by executing p search tasks in parallel, followed by merging the results of the search tasks, as discussed in the preceding section. Figure 3 shows that the one-processor version of the Gauss-Seidel auction algorithm spends a significant portion of its computation time (depending on the problem size and density) executing the search tasks. Thus, the algorithm has considerable speedup potential through parallelization of the search, particularly for dense problems.
The design of the synchronous Gauss-Seidel auction algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 4 . Two synchronization points are included in each bidding iteration. The first is a barrier (based on the 6 and the empirical results of Fig. 5 . The only discrepancy is that the empirical synchronization time grows slighly faster than the predicted time with the number of processors; this is probably 5. Coded Implementations and Computational Results due to increased contention for access to critical sections in the monitors. Similar phenomena were observed by Dritz and Boyle [DrB87] in their experiments using the Encore Multimax. 
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Synchronous Jacobi Auction Algorithm
In this algorithm, multiple processors are used to generate bids simultaneously for different persons. The number of simultaneous bids is equal to the minimum of the number of processors used and the number of unassigned persons. Each processor computes the bid associated with a different person. The resulting bids are then processed at a single processor, called the parent, in order to update the object prices and assignments, and the list of unassigned persons. The design of the algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 7 . Again, there are two synchronization points per iteration, which are implemented with the extension of the barrier monitor discussed previously.
The synchronization after the compute bids operation is only a barrier monitor because no merging of the individual computations by each processor is required (unlike the synchronous Gauss-Seidel auction algorithm). It turns out that this reduces the overall synchronization overhead.
An important aspect of the synchronous Jacobi auction algorithm is that the amount of potential parallel work varies across iterations; specifically, it depends on the number of remaining unassigned persons. When this number is less than the number of available processors, some of the processors will be idle; see Fig. 8 . In order to prevent idle processors for competing for shared resources such as synchronization locks, the size of the synchronization barriers was adaptively modified to match the number of non-idle processors. Idle processors were diverted to a rest barrier, waiting to rejoin the computation when the number of unassigned persons grew larger than the number of available processors (at the beginning of a new -scaling phase). Figure 9 illustrates the performance of the synchronous Jacobi auction algorithm. Again, search time and synchronization time were measured for the parent processor. The search time per iteration is independent of the number of processors, but the total number of iterations (and therefore also the total search time) is reduced when the number of processors increases because then the average number of parallel bids per iteration also increases. Note the relatively small synchronization time required for the Jacobi auction algorithm when compared to the Gauss-Seidel algorithm. This is due to three factors. First, the synchronization after computing bids is simpler because no merging of the results of the processors is required. Second, the number of synchronization calls is reduced because the total number of iterations is reduced by processing multiple bids in parallel. Finally, the number of processors which contend for a synchronization lock is reduced adaptively when the number of unassigned persons is less than the number of processors, leading to simpler synchronization (with reduced contention) at each iteration.
The results of Fig. 9 reflect a small anomaly: increasing the number of processors from 8 to 10
produces an apparent increase in computation time. The reason is that, due to accidental reasons, the number of iterations required for convergence with 10 processors increased significantly over the corresponding number with 8 processors (the sample path of the algorithm changes with the number of processors).
Synchronous Hybrid Auction Algorithm
The results obtained with the previous two synchronous algorithms suggest that an efficient parallel implementation should combine the speedups available from Gauss-Seidel parallelization and Jacobi parallelization. In particular, by computing multiple bids simultaneously, and by using multiple processors to compute each bid, a multiplicative effect may be achievable whereby the overall speedup is the product of the Gauss-Seidel speedup and the Jacobi speedup. The synchronous hybrid auction algorithm is an attempt to realize this multiplicative speedup. In this algorithm, unassigned persons are selected two at a time, and two bids are computed in parallel (Jacobi parallelization with two processors). For each person i, the set of admissible objects A(i) is searched in parallel by p/2 processors (Gauss-Seidel parallelization).
The overall design of the algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 10 . There are three synchronization points per iteration. An initial barrier is included to delay the start of the search tasks until all of the object prices are updated from the previous iteration. A separate merge search monitor is included for each person, and a synchronization barrier is used to wait until both bids are computed before proceeding to award the auctions. The size of the barriers and monitors were tailored to the number of processors which rendezvous at each synchronization point. Thus, the first barrier synchronizes 2s processors, the merge search monitors synchronize s processors, and the last barrier synchronizes only two processors, thereby keeping the synchronization overhead to a minimum. processors used (even though the total number of iterations has been reduced by a factor of 1.83 due to Jacobi parallelization). This synchronization time represents the dominant part of the overall computation time when the number of processors is large, and prevents a multiplicative combination of the speedups from Gauss-Seidel and Jacobi parallelization.
Asynchronous Jacobi Auction Algorithm
This algorithm tries to reduce the overall synchronization overhead by allowing bids to be computed based on older values of the object prices. Specifically, processors start computing new bids without waiting for other processors to complete their price updates. Some synchronization is still required to guarantee that the object prices are monotonically increasing (cf. Eq. (15)), and to guarantee that the computation of a person bid is not unnecessarily replicated by multiple processors. This synchronization is implemented using locks on each object and a lock on the queue of unassigned persons; these locks allow only one processor at a time to modify the price of a given object, and only one processor at a time to update the queue of unassigned persons. Figure 12 illustrates the design of the asynchronous Jacobi auction algorithm. To reduce contention for the locks when the number of persons in the unassigned persons queue is lower than the number of processors, excess processors are diverted to a barrier to wait for a new -scaling cycle.
The performance of the asynchronous Jacobi auction algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 13 for three sizes of randomly generated problems: 500 persons with 80% density, 1000 persons with 20% density which affects the number of bids which must be generated for convergence. In the test runs, the number of bids generated varied by under 4% from run to run.
Note the increase in speedup achieved by the asynchronous Jacobi auction algorithm compared to the results obtained for similar problems by the synchronous Jacobi auction algorithm in Fig. 9 ; the speedups have been improved from 4.5 to nearly 5.8, which represents a 29% improvement. The increased speedup is achieved because of the improved load balance among processors, as processors do not wait idly for other processors to complete their bidding process.
Another important point illustrated by Fig. 13 is the effect of problem size on the speedup achievable through Jacobi parallelization. Note that the speedups obtained by for all three problem sizes are roughly comparable; the fluctuations in speedup when using large numbers of processors are due to variations in the number of bids required for convergence when different numbers of processors are used. The reason for this behavior is that, although more bids are generated for larger problems, the number of iterations for which there are few bidders (e.g. 1 or 2) also increases for large problems, thereby limiting the potential speedup. In contrast, the potential speedup achievable through GaussSeidel parallelization increases with problem size, as the number of feasible assignments for each person increases.
Asynchronous Hybrid Auction Algorithms
We implemented two asynchronous hybrid auction algorithms. One of the two algorithms is quite inefficient, but the reasons for this are worth explaining. The design of the algorithms is illustrated in Fig. 14 . Instead of an unassigned person queue, there is a queue of unassigned search tasks and bid tasks. Each unassigned person is represented by s search tasks and one bid task, ordered consecutively in the queue so that the bid task follows the s search tasks. Different types of asynchronous algorithms can be generated by controlling the number of search tasks generated for each unassigned person. As before, a synchronization lock is required to allow tasks to be read and generated one at a time. Figure 14 illustrates the processing of a single processor. After reading a task from the task queue, the processor determines whether it is a search task or a bid task. If it is a search task for person i, the processor searches the appropriate segment of the object set A(i) and writes a message in shared memory with the results of its search (the two highest net profit levels and the object offering the highest net profit). The message is protected by a lock indexed by the processor index and the person index, which guarantees that the message must be read in its entirety by the bid task. After writing the message, the processor releases the lock and attempts to acquire another task.
If the task acquired is a bid task, the processor must read the messages left by the search tasks for this person. Some of these search tasks may still be in process, so the bid processor may be reading old messages. The processor locks each message, reads the contents, releases the lock, and merges the results of the individual search tasks into an overall search result. This is then used to compute a bid (from person i to object j). The processor then locks object j, updates the price and assignment of object j, and releases the object. If an unassigned person results from this operation, the processor then locks the unassigned task queue, inserts s search tasks and one bid task for the unassigned person at the end of the queue, and releases the queue.
The algorithm described above will be called Asynchronous Hybrid Auction 1 (or AHA1) algorithm. The difficulty with this algorithm is that a bid is often computed based on outdated information, leading to a large increase in the number of losing bids (and therefore the number of iterations required for convergence). Ideally, the bid task for person i would wait for the search tasks for person i to be completed; however, this requires time-wasting synchronization. An alternative way to accomplish the same effect is to require the processor that executes the last search task corresponding to a person to also execute the bid task corresponding to that person immediately after the search task. In this manner, the likelihood that the other search tasks corresponding to that person are complete by the time the bid task is executed is substantially increased. We call this version of the algorithm Asynchronous Hybrid Auction 2 (or AHA2). Figure 15 illustrates the relative performance (averaged across three runs) of the AHA1 and AHA2 algorithms for the same 1000 person assignment problem. Here the number of search tasks per bid was two for all the runs reported. Thus, the overhead for merging the search results is independent of the number of processors. As a result, the computation time decreases monotonically with the number of processors used. The AHA1 algorithm is nearly twice as slow as the AHA2 algorithm.
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The reason is illustrated in Fig. 16 , which shows the number of bids generated by each algorithm up to convergence. The number of bids for the AHA1 algorithm is nearly double! The explanation is that the bid task is often generating the bids before the search tasks have been completed; these bids based on old information are often rejected, so that additional bids are required. The results illustrate the importance of careful management of asynchronous tasks in order to guarantee that the processors are doing useful work (i.e., work that will not become irrelevant when new information is acquired.) In these experiments, the number of search tasks was set to two. As before, the number of iterations required for convergence depends on the order in which the processors complete their tasks, and varies between different executions of the algorithm. The times shown are averaged over three runs. As Fig. 17 indicates, the absolute sequential run time of the auction algorithm varies among the problem classes, from 54 seconds for the extended cost problems to 40 seconds for random problems. Fig. 17 illustrates that the AHA2 algorithm obtains similar reductions in computation time for each problem class using parallel processing. . In these problems, the number of search tasks per bid was equal to two.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proved the validity of an asynchronous version of the auction algorithm, which can serve as a model of asynchronous implementations in a broad variety of parallel machines. We have also provided the first experimental comparison of a variety of synchronous and asynchronous versions of the algorithm. Our conclusion is that the better asynchronous implementations outperform substantially the corresponding synchronous implementations on a shared memory machine. This is in agreement with other recent studies [ChZ89] , [ElB89] , which have confirmed the advantage of asynchronous implementations of parallel network flow algorithms.
